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The long drawn-out dispute in 1982 saw industrial relations in the 
National Health Service at an all-time low. That dispute was the first to 
involve in a united way all of the many sub groups of staff employed in the 
NHS - administrative and clerical, nursing, ancillary, para-medical, 
technical, works and doctors. The decade of the 1970s had seen a steady 
build up to this situation; a dramatic growth in trade union and professional 
association membership and organisation; various groups of health service 
staff taking industrial action for the first time; and difficulties associated 
with a relatively strict enforcement of incomes policy. Industrial relations in 
the NHS were also characterised by an extremely centralised bargaining 
system through one general and eight functional Whitley Councils; a 
relatively under-developed personnel and industrial relations management 
function; inter-union competition and rivalry between trade unions and 
professional associations. (Z) 
In the aftermath of the 1982 dispute, industrial relations in the NHS 
have somewhat faded from the public eye. But developments are taking 
place in four particular areas - reorganisation of the NHS in Scotland, 
privatisation, expenditure cuts and the possibility of the recommendations 
of the Griffiths Report being introduced into Scotland<3l Each of these 
issues will be examined in this paper, but central consideration will be given 
to the process of reorganisation as through this some of the dominant 
problems and concerns about the way the NHS is managed can be 
examined. These include the relationships between the government, via 
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the Scottish Home and Health Department, and the fifteen Scottish health 
boards; the relationships between the health boards as employers and their 
employees; the complex inter-relationships between trade unions and 
professional organisations; and the role of the personnel function in the 
management of the health service. 
Reorganisation of the NBS in Scotland 
The details of the policy which led to the reorganisation of the NHS in 
Scotland are dealt with in David Hunter's chapter and need no further 
elaboration. Rather we will concentrate on the substantive issues that had 
to be settled between management and staff interests once the decision was 
taken to remove districts. These included the timing of reorganisation; the 
oversight of grading levels of senior posts in the new structures; the shape of 
the new structures; the arrangements for slotting in and competition for the 
new posts; the arrangements for officers displaced by the restructuring; 
appeals procedure and details of a premature retirement policy. Some of 
these points were for negotiation, others consultation; some on an all-
Scotland basis involving all the relevant trade unions and professional 
organisations, others at a health board level, sometimes with all 
organisations, sometimes only with those representing a particular 
category of staff. It is a complex picture which we will attempt to analyse 
under the headings outlined above, relating the events to the central 
features of the industrial relations system in the NHS. 
The Impetus Towards Reorganisation 
Following the publication of Patients First, <4l which outlined the 
Conservative government's philosophy for the management of the health 
service in England and Wales, the Scottish Home and Health Department 
issued its consultative paper Structure and Management of the National 
Health Service in Scotland. (S) The health service in England had three tiers 
of organisation- regional, area and district and Patients First proposed, 
among other things, the removal of the area tier. Scotland, on the other 
hand was essentially a two tier system, area and district, but five of the 
fifteen health boards operated without districts. The remaining ten health 
boards had between two and five districts, giving a total of twenty-nine 
districts in the country as a whole. The decision to create districts was an 
administrative act of the health boards at the time of the 1974 
reorganisation; in Scotland only the health boards are statutory bodies. 
The government's aims for reorganisation in Scotland at this stage can 
be summarised: 
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1. Boards should work towards removing districts and replace them by 
units of management, but those boards which felt that this was not 
possible could make a case for their retention. 
2. Management arrangements at local level should be strengthened with 
greater delegation of authority and responsibility to units of 
management. 
3. Local functional managers of non-clinical support services were to 
become accountable to unit administrators not to area functional 
managers. 
These basic aims were later confirmed in March 1981 when the SHHD 
issued its circular on reorganisation. <6l Health boards were still permitted to 
be flexible in their implementation of the circular. The size and shape of the 
new units of management were left to local circumstances and no date was 
prescribed centrally for the reorganisation. 
The laissez-faire approach in fact meant that a number of boards, 
Argyll and Clyde, Grampian, Greater Glasgow, Highland, Lanarkshire, 
Lothian and Tayside decided to devolve greater responsibility to unit 
management within a framework of districts. Three boards, later known as 
the 'first wave' boards, Ayrshire and Arran, Fife, Forth Valley, decided at 
an early stage that they would remove districts, while Borders, and 
Dumfries and Galloway health boards, although not having districts, also 
proceeded to revise their management structure in line with the philosophy 
of maximum devolution to units. Between March 1981 and the autumn of 
1983 two boards, Argyll and Clyde and Grampian shifted into the removing 
districts camp, but then Argyll and Clyde changed its decision yet again and 
this, as we shall see, precipitated a directive approach by the Secretary of 
State. 
Although the first wave boards examined their structures and 
produced proposals for new units, some based on geography, some on 
functional specialities, some on a mixture of these two basic principles, a 
period of uncertainty, confusion and frustration ensued in the attempts to 
designate a date for reorganisation and in establishing the staffing 
arrangements for the new posts. The Secretary of State's hoped for 
implementation date of April 1982 proved impossible to achieve. 
Meanwhile, in England the new District Health Authorities took over on 
1st April1982, and the Welsh reorganisation was effected a year later. 
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The staffing arrangements for England and Wales were jointly 
determined by management and staff interests in the General Whitley 
Council, with details for specific staff groups being negotiated in the 
appropriate functional Whitley Council. A new mechanism was established 
to deal with arrangements for reorganisation in Scotland, the General 
Whitley Council, Reorganisation Sub-Committee (Scotland). 
Representation on the staff side of this body was via the functional Whitley 
Councils which eliminated any potential difficulties of TUC affiliated 
unions refusing to sit on the same body as non-TUC professional 
organisations. This committee met three times, in July October and 
December, 1983. 
There was, however, a basic difference of opinion between 
management and staff over the timing of reorganisation; management 
favoured an early date because two years had passed since circular 1981 
(GEN) 14 was issued, while the staff side favoured a later date so that all 
boards could move simultaneously. Initially a compromise date of 1st April 
1984 was agreed; posts affected by reorganisation which became vacant 
were frozen and the first wave boards proceeded with local consultation 
and negotiation. 
It is worth noting at this stage that not all organisations involved in the 
health service actually favoured the proposed reorganisation in Scotland. 
Trade unions and professional associations felt that it was an unnecessary 
imposition on Scotland from London and, moveover, that it was stimulated 
by political prejudice rather than any logical approach to the efficient 
management of the service; the prejudice that the service was over-
administered and that therefore the number of administrators should be 
reduced. As we have seen a number of health boards had decided not to 
remove districts and when Argyll and Clyde health board again changed its 
decision and decided not to remove districts, the laissez-faire approach of 
the Scottish Office turned to compulsion and direction. 
The Secretary of State's announcement that boards would be 
instructed to remove districts came in the form of a written answer to a 
parliamentary question on lOth November 1983. (?) The details soon 
followed in a circular. (B) But this was direction from the centre without the 
direct hand of the Secretary of State. Both the parliamentary answer and 
the circular clearly stated that the decision followed a meeting between the 
Minister for Health and Social Work and the health board chairmen and 
had "the concurrence of the chairmen". This is further evidence of the 
growing power and influence of the chairmen, some of whom in this 
instance were party to a decision which was not the policy of their health 
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board. The parliamentary answer also reflected the latest development in 
health service management thinking in England- the Griffiths Report. (9) 
The Secretary of State took the view that a common form of organisation 
would provide a firm basis for consideration of Griffiths- a point to which 
we shall return. 
The compulsory removal of districts threw the timetable into disorder. 
Those boards which were well on the way to meeting the 1st April 1984 
deadline did not want to be held up. As they had all decided in principle to 
abolish districts some two years earlier many senior management posts had 
been left unfilled or were held by people' acting up' one or more grades. On 
the other hand those boards which now had to devise new structures needed 
as much time as possible. The staff side of the Reorganisation Sub-
Committee (Scotland) favoured a late common date, although there was 
some division as to what date was actually feasible and indeed a minority of 
the trade union representatives wanted to meet the Secretary of State and 
argue the case against compulsory removal of districts in all boards. The 
final compromise was that the first wave boards would proceed on 1st 
April, 1984 the others would reorganise by 1st June 1984, but that no board 
could make appointments to reorganised posts from outwith their own 
board until such time as all boards were ready to proceed to the round of 
appointments for officers 'displaced' as a result of reorganisation. Thus the 
first wave boards had to wait at least two months with vacant posts before 
being able to appoint displaced officers from outwith the boards, and in 
practice the delay was much longer. In effect it could be argued that 
through this device the staff side achieved their objective of a common date 
at the point where it mattered- when competition for posts moved to an all-
Scotland basis. 
The Overview of Gradings 
The delay in fixing an implementation date for Scotland did have an 
advantage in that the experience of reorganisation in England and in Wales 
was available to management and staff sides alike. Indeed the principal 
agreement, that on staffing arrangements which determined the 
procedures for filling posts, was reached in the General Whitley Council 
prior to the first meeting of the Reorganisation Sub-Committee (Scotland). 
One vital issue which both the English and Welsh Authorities had had to 
deal with was the question of ensuring that there was consistency of grading 
of senior posts in the new structure. In England this task had been 
undertaken by the Regional Health Authorities, whereas in Wales the task 
was undertaken by chairmen of the Welsh Health Authorities on an 
informal basis. What device would be used in Scotland? 
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The need for some overview of gradings arose because the decision on 
what exactly should replace districts was left to health boards to determine. 
This was consistent with the devolutionary philosophy of the restructuring 
exercise, but in marked contrast to the 1974 reorganisation when the 
Scottish Home and Health Department authorised all the senior grades. 
But the devolved approach had the danger that grading drift could emerge 
and similar posts in different health boards could be graded differently. 
Grading drift is seen by the Department as against the interest<> of the 
taxpayer to the extent that people are paid more than the appropriate rate 
for doing a similar job. 
The initial proposal by management was to use MAGOG, the 
Management Group on Gradings. Created in 1981 as MGAFGS, the 
Management Group on Administrative and Finance Gradings, its remit 
was extended to senior nursing grades in April1983. MAGOG was a way of 
devolving collectively to health authorities grading control based on a 
system of job evaluation so as to achieve consistency. It was intended to 
operate both in normal circumstances and in the context of restructuring. 
Its creation and the extension of its remit were both agreed by health board 
chairmen who also agreed that boards would comply with the Group. 
There were some fears from within the service that MAGOG would 
not be able to cope with the demands that restructuring would have placed 
on it, and that involvement in restructuring could undermine MAGOG's 
role as a grading review mechanism. Even more fundamental objections 
came from the staff side. Firstly, the trade unions opposed MAGOG 
anyway because it is a unilateral management job evaluation technique 
with no trade union input, and secondly because in the context of 
reorganisation the use of MAGOG to evaluate grades would cut across the 
agreements on grading reached jointly through the Whitley system. 
A new ad hoc body then emerged- the Scottish Chairmen's Grading 
Committee, subsequently known as the Fyfe Committee after its own 
chairman, Mr. W.S. Fyfe, the chairman of Ayrshire and Arran health 
board. In the first instance the Fyfe Committee comprised the chairmen of 
the five first wave boards; two members from the mainland single district 
boards; three assessors, a board secretary, a treasurer and a chief area 
nursing officer and was serviced by a secretariat of two drawn from serving 
health board officers. Later chairmen from the other boards were added. 
Like MAGOG, but unlike many similar exercises in private industry, there 
was no staff side input. 
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The Fyfe Committee was granted full delegation of power to ensure 
consistency of grading by the Secretary of State. Thus he could claim that 
any grading decisions arrived at by the Committee were not those of the 
Secretary of State, nor of the SHHD, but of the boards themselves acting 
collectively through their chairmen. The service as a whole had been given 
the responsibility of policing the decisions of individual health boards. 
The role and powers of the Fyfe Committee were the subject of debate 
in the Reorganisation Sub-Committee (Scotland) and the staff side were 
assured that its task would be equivalent to that done by the Regions in 
England and that it would not impose decisions. On the other hand the 
Department circular on the Committee makes it clear that unless boards 
can supply further information to justify their grading then the decision of 
the Fyfe Committee stands. 
Clearly with these two contradictory views problems would arise if, 
and when, the Fyfe Committee overturned any grading submitted to it by 
boards. This indeed happened. The situation is further complicated by the 
fact the boards discussed their structures and gradings with their staff 
locally. The trade unions take the view that these discussions took the form 
of negotiations and that the grading structure finally reached was in effect 
negotiated agreements, especially as they were agreed within the context of 
the reorganised structure costing no more than its predecessor, and in the 
light of functional Whitley Council agreements on grade indication factors. 
The Department took the view that local talks were only consultative and 
that the boards acting in concert through the Fyfe Committee took the final 
decision and that is the one which has to be upheld. Each board was 
represented on the Committee through its chairman and could therefore 
not justifiably object to the decisions reached. 
Many boards, however, did find themselves in an awkward situation 
when the Fyfe Committee altered gradings. Their staff sides were arguing 
that Fyfe was only advisory and therefore boards ought to honour their 
agreements with the staff side. In some cases boards did re-submit, but 
usually without success, and the ad hoc mechanism had no appeal channel 
built into it, although the original MAGOG proposals did allow for 
disputed gradings to be the subject of discussions betwen the board and 
MAGOG and for final resolution by the SHHD. With Fyfe, however, 
reasons for changing gradings were not given to boards. Individual officers, 
on the other hand, have a right of appeal on the grading attached to their 
post under existing Whitley agreements, and staff sides are threatening a 
number of individual appeals once the new structures are in operation. 
Such appeals are likely to be strongly resisted by the Department on the 
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grounds that it was the health boards themselves who agreed to accept the 
Fyfe Committee's verdict on the grade, rather than their own original view. 
Indeed the Department felt it necessary to caution health boards against 
premature appeals and urged them to allow a reasonable time to elapse for 
new posts to become fully established and post holders to settle in. (to) 
Lack of Coterminous Structures 
It is not yet clear how many posts actually had their grading proposals 
altered (and some were upgraded), but it does appear that a 
disproportionate number were nursing posts rather than administrative or 
finance ones. This relates to another feature of the structures a number of 
health boards have determined- administrative, finance and nursing units 
of management are not coterminous. 
Boards were given a free hand to determine their own structures by the 
SHHD, and did so in consulation with their staff interests. Some boards, 
such as Ayrshire and Arran evolved a structure that was largely based on 
functional specialities; others, such as Forth Valley based the structure 
largely on geography. The norm, however, has been to draw up structures 
based on a mixture of functional speciality and geography. 
With the removal of districts the previous management body, the 
District Executive Group (District Administrator, District Finance 
Officer, District Nursing Officer, District Medical Officer) ceased to exist. 
In its place came the Unit Management Team which comprises the Unit 
Administrator, Director of Nursing Services and a senior member of the 
medical staff and usually, but not always, the Finance Officer. The fact that 
what is understood by a 'unit' varies according to the staff group concerned 
may indeed pose some difficulties when the new structures are functioning. 
It is not clear in situations where two nursing units relate to one 
administration unit, whether the two Directors of Nursing Services will be 
part of a unit team with the administrator covering both nursing units, or 
whether the administrator will be part of two unit teams, or indeed whether 
the DNS of the smaller unit will only relate to a unit team via another DNS. 
To fit in to the philosophy of devolved power and responsibilities, the 
administrative units had to be of such a size to attract salaries which would 
in turn attract competent senior managers, but at the same time be close to 
the delivery of patient services. Finance units are related to budgets and 
there tend to be fewer finance units than administrative units in all the 
structures that have been evolved. The problematic area, however, was 
nursing. Where administrative units were determined by functional 
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speciality- acute services, geriatric services, psychiatric services- then it 
was relatively easy to have nursing units to match them. The difficulty lay 
with what to do with two particular services- maternity and community. 
The first is characterised by relatively small numbers of beds and staff; the 
second by geographical spread. In some administrative units one or both of 
these services were subsumed within larger units; in other boards they 
constituted a separate unit. 
On the nursing side, however, the nurses who worked in these services 
are generally represented by separate organisations from nurses in other 
areas - the Royal College of Midwives for maternity, and the Scottish 
Health Visitors Association for community. These organisations see 
themselves as professional associations rather than as trade unions, and in 
their view it was vital for the future well being of their profession that 
separate maternity and community units existed for nurses, so that 
midwives and health visitors could aspire to become Directors of Nursing 
Services for their respective specialties. The pressure to have these separate 
units was particularly strong in Greater Glasgow where the agreed 
structure comprised eleven administrative units, nine finance and nineteen 
nursing. The RCM was outraged at Lanarkshire Health Board's proposal 
not to have a separate midwifery unit. 
The corollary of being separate was that the small maternity and 
community units tended to attract lower gradings when assessed by the Fyfe 
Committee, and indeed in some cases the removal of maternity from a 
larger general nursing unit threatened the grading of that post as well. Thus 
it is the nurse organisations which are most affected by and concerned 
about the grading reversals of the Fyfe Committee. 
While the particular interests of the RCM and the SHY A pressed them 
towards separate units, the main professional organisation for nurses, the 
Royal College of Nursing, strongly favoured coterminous units, 
particularly with the spectre of the Griffiths Report in the background. This 
proposed general managers in the units and if these were to be drawn from 
the existing second in line officers in units, then nursing would be at a 
distinct disadvantage if nursing units did not match administrative or 
medical ones. 
While Greater Glasgow presents the most extreme picture, the 
situation in the rest of Scotland varies markedly. In some boards all the 
maternity and community services were grouped together to form 
reasonably large units which attracted relatively high gradings for both 
nurses and administrators, but where separate small maternity and 
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community nursing units exist the gradings are generally low. While this 
may create a limited career structure for midwives and health visitors in 
their own speciality, it does mean that senior nurse managers will continue 
to be drawn from the general and psychiatric areas. 
Consultation/Negotiation at Health Board Level 
The question of timing, the overview of gradings and staffing 
arrangements were dealt with at national level, but a number of issues 
arising out of reorganisation were dealt with at health board level. The 
mechanisms developed for dealing with local consultation and negotiation 
were essentially the same throughout the country. Initially meetings were 
held between management and all the staff interests in the board but with 
the N ALGO branch secretary always acting as the local staff side secretary, 
as was the case nationally. These were based on ad hoc reorganisation 
committees rather than on existing joint consultative committees and thus 
got round the problem, which exists in many boards, ofTUC and non-TUC 
organisations refusing to sit together in the same committees. Once 
consultation had taken place on structures, the large all-embracing 
committees broke down into smaller groups dealing with particular 
categories of staff. 
The essential issue to be decided was which new posts were for slotting 
in and which for competition and the agreement on staffing arrangements 
clearly stated that this was a mattter for negotiation at board level. (II) 
Slotting in was where the job was virtually unchanged and the post holder 
continued to undertake substantially the same duties; competition was for 
posts where a number of detailed definitions were met. These agreements 
are designed to give existing board employees the first opportunity to be 
appointed to the new posts and to minimise the number of officers 
displaced by the reorganisation. An additional agreement gave personal 
protection of salary and conditions of service for a specified number of 
years for officers whose posts were downgraded as a result of 
reorganisation. 
Local negotiations had to take place within the confines of agreements 
on equivalent grade and substantial promotion which were reached in the 
relevant functional Whitley Councils. There was some delay in reaching 
this agreement for administrative and clerical staff as the staff side insisted 
that Board Secretary and Treasurer posts should be subject to competition 
as these posts had all been upgraded by one main scale to reflect new 
responsibilities. Management resisted this for some time, and in the 
absence of a firm agreement the first wave boards proceeded locally on the 
267 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1985 
basis of the management offer, which reflected the agreement which had 
been used in England some two years previously. 
One specific area where representation from staff interests led to 
changes in board plans for restructuring concerned the establishment (or 
not) of area posts for professions supplementary to medicine e.g. 
physiotherapists, speech therapists, radiographers. In some boards such 
posts were established for one or more of these professions, usually on a 
part time, part managerial, part clinical basis. One exception to this was the 
attempt to establish area radiographer posts. This was opposed by the 
BMA which argued that the responsibility for radiography lay with 
clinicians and a dangerous conflict could arise if radiographer managers 
were appointed. This is but one reflection of a continuing conflict between 
doctors and a range of medical related professions which have 
responsibilities and duties in similar areas. 
Generally these local negotiations seem to have operated smoothly 
through the special reorganisation committees that were established which 
were made up of all organisations, both trade unions and professional 
associations. What potential might there be for such arrangements to 
continue? 
The TUC unions' basic objection to the presence of non- affiliated 
organisations is that they undermine the possibility of developing common 
staff side positions because their views on matters such as privatisation, 
financial cutbacks and overseas patients are so diametrically opposed to 
those of the TUC unions. Indeed some trade union officers would go as far 
as to argue that it is only the trade unions which are interested in the overall 
service that the health service provides, whereas the professional 
associations are largely and primarily interested in their profession. Thus 
the trade union view is that the arrangements for reorganisation were a one-
off arrangement which came to an end once reorganisation was in place. 
Indeed negotiations on procedural agreements for the new structures are 
taking place in the existing joint consultative committees rather than the 
reorganisation committees. Without the common purpose of 
reorganisation it is unlikely that TUC and non-TUC organisations will 
work together. This will be particularly so as issues such as Griffiths, 
privatisation and financial cutbacks come to the fore in the autumn; issues 
on which the TUC and non-TUC organisations are divided. 
Personnel Management and Industrial Relations in the New Structures 
District Executive Groups operated on a consensus basis, with 
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collective responsibility for running services, budgets, and personnel 
matters. In effect any one chief officer had a power of veto over the others. 
Consensus management has been under fire for some time; accused of 
'lowest common denominator decisions' and of long delays in the 
management process. (IZ) The thrust of reorganisation is towards individual 
accountability and responsibility, although some element of collaborative 
team working is expected from unit teams. Second in line officers will have 
control of budgets and resources and will also have responsibility for 
industrial relations at unit level including the power to dismiss. 
With the removal of districts the twenty District Personnel Officers 
were also removed. The essential dilemma facing boards in reorganising 
the personnel function was whether to centralise at area level or to 
decentralise to the units. If unit personnel posts were established it was 
unlikely that they would attract senior gradings and hence would not attract 
senior experienced people to the posts. On the other hand if all the 
personnel resources were centralised at area headquarters then all sorts of 
problems and difficulties could arise and possibly grow at local level if 
assistance and advice was not readily on hand. 
Most boards have evolved a compromise whereby there will be a 
personnel presence at unit level, but these officers will essentially be 
dealing with the personnel administration aspects of the function -
appointments, recruitment, contracts of employment, terms and 
conditions of service, and while providing some limited industrial relations 
advice, the burden of this work will be undertaken by unit administrators 
and area personnel departments. The latter have been strengthened by 
drawing in the former DPOs and allocating responsibility for developing 
policies to specific officers. In some cases the area personnel department 
has been further strengthened by the appointment of additional officers 
with special responsibility for industrial relations policy. Thus the intention 
is to have the area personnel department developing policy and guidelines 
and, indeed, training for the new unit managers who now have industrial 
relations as a major element of their responsibility. This centralised policy 
and advice service is supported by unit personnel officers dealing with the 
more routine aspects of the personnel function. 
It remains to be seen whether this structure can overcome a problem 
which existed previously in multi-district boards of policies being 
interpreted in different ways in different districts, and of trade unions 
seeking to level up practice in all districts to the level of the best. If 
anything, with the multiplicity of units which now exist in all boards the 
potential for variation increases and thus places additional responsibility on 
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both unit managers and central personnel policy makers and advisors. 
One controversial point in this reorganisation of the personnel 
function has been the question of the need for separate nursing personnel 
officers. Under the district structure, Senior Nursing Officers (personnel) 
existed in a number of districts, but there was evidence that their duties 
largely fell into the personnel administration category and when industrial 
relations issues were to the fore the District Personnel Officer became 
heavily involved. There has therefore been considerable pressure to 
establish a unified personnel service at unit level. In some boards this has 
been achieved; in others it is still a matter of controversy. 
The devolution of the power to dismiss to single officers, rather than 
the consensus management group has concerned trade unions. They felt 
that the consensus system meant that any one chief officer wanting to 
dismiss an employee had first to justify their position to three other senior 
managers, and that this often tempered what might have been ill-advised 
decisions. In Glasgow in particular the trade unions attempted to press that 
the authority to dismiss should be vested in more than one officer. Their 
concern was that errors in judgement would be made by senior managers 
which from the trade union point of view would have to be challenged 
through the appeals mechanism. If individual senior managers were 
frequently the subject of appeals this would result in a situation where the 
board would either have to dismiss the appeal or dismiss the senior 
manager. While private companies might be inclined to the latter, it was 
feared that health boards may opt for the former. 
Displaced Officers and Premature Retirement 
A central concern of the staff sides was that the reorganisation should 
not lead to compulsory redundancies. Boards had to achieve their 
reorganisation in such a way that the new structures cost no more than the 
old, and their targets for reducing management costs, set in 1982, were 
adhered to. (!3) The General Whitley Council agreement on staffing 
arrangements protected those officers displaced from their employing 
boards by ensuring that they had first opportunity for posts in other boards 
at the first stage of all-Scotland competition. When the second wave of 
boards commenced reorganisation at the end of 1983 it was agreed that this 
stage could not commence until all boards had completed their internal 
process. Thus the first wave boards would have to wait until at least 1st 
June, or longer if any board had not completed its internal processes. 
In the event the number of displaced officers was relatively few; about 
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a score on the administration and finance side, somewhat less for nurses, 
but they did cover the entire range of the grading structure. The small 
number was largely because posts likely to be affected by reorganisation 
were left unfilled or filled by officers in an acting-up capacity even before 
the formal agreement specified that this must be the case after 1st August 
1983. In fact a number of first wave boards were unable to fill all their unit 
posts and began the reorganised system on 1st April with key posts vacant, 
despite attempts by at least one board to obtain a special dispensation from 
the agreed staffing arrangements timetable. Overall, at the end of the 
internal stage of the process there were more unfilled posts than displaced 
officers, although the grades and specialisrns of these did not necessarily 
match. Some boards chose to retain officers in a supernumerary capacity 
until such time as a suitable vacancy arose. 
In order to try and coordinate the lists of displaced officers and vacant 
posts a clearing house was established which carne into operation in July 
and even at that stage some boards were still holding up the process as they 
had not made appointments to their new unit posts. The net effect of these 
delays and uncertainties was that open competition for vacant posts did not 
take place until October and in some boards key posts in the new structures 
were unfilled for over six months. 
A notorious feature of the reorganisation in England had been the 
massive number of premature retirements over and above that estimated 
by the DHSS; 435 compared to 2,830.<14) In January 1984 the SHHD 
estimated that some 200 posts at District level would be directly affected by 
reorganisation but that it was not possible to estimate accurately the 
number likely to come forward for early retirement. (IS) Anxious that the 
public criticism of the situation in England was not repeated the 
Department embarked on an informal estimate of likely premature 
retirements with the Area Personnel Officers' group. In Scotland 
individual applications had to be vetted by the health boards and submitted 
to the Department for approval. In this way a stricter control was kept in 
the number of premature retirements. 
An SHHD circular in 1983 stressed that there was a need to 
demonstrate where the reduncancy was occurring to justify a retirement 
claim and that the call upon the superannuation fund had to be totally 
justified. This letter was later the subject of a staff side complaint in the 
Reorganisation Sub-Committee as in their view this was the SHHD 
exceeding the terms of a Whitley Council agreement. Notwithstanding this, 
the Department continued to interpret the agreement in a very rigid way in 
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retirement, but whose cases were not immediately accepted by the SHHD, 
had to apply for posts they did not really want, and to which boards did not 
really expect to appoint them, in order to remain eligible for premature 
retirement. 
By the end of the first stage of reorganisation some fifty five 
applications for premature retirement had been approved. It was expected 
that the proportion of early retirers/total staff employed would be even 
lower in Scotland than Northern Region which had the lowest proportion of 
premature retirements in England. A number of applications were rejected 
either because the applicant was too young or because subsequently they 
were offered posts, and two of the rejections were the subject of an appeal 
by the relevant trade union. 
Cat and Mouse 
While reorganisation has been the focus of events in the NHS in 
Scotland, privatisation, cuts and, most recently Griffiths have been the key 
words in England and Wales. Until June 1984, these issues were rather 
dormant in Scotland, partly because attention and energy has been directed 
towards reorganisation, but partly because of different attitudes and 
policies of health boards in Scotland to them. While health boards used 
reorganisation to justify their delay in responding to the Secretary of State's 
September 1983 circular on privatisation, equally the Department was slow 
to produce a promised discussion paper on Griffiths in Scotland. This cat 
and mouse response ended abruptly when the document on Griffiths was 
produced on June 6th< 16) and some two weeks later boards were instructed 
to put some of their services out to tender. <17) 
Privatisation 
In the summer of 1983 health boards were requested to test the cost 
effectiveness of catering, domestic and laundry services by putting them out 
to tender, and to report to the Department by April1984.<18l Compared 
with England little progress has been made in contracting-out services in 
Scotland. Boards were treading cautiously, partly out of a concern not to 
rush into changes which might be regretted later, partly from a belief that 
the in-house service is best and partly from a fear of industrial action by 
unions whose members would be affected. 
What happened between the autumn of 1983 and the spring of 1984 
was that boards examined those areas of the services under threat in which 
costs were above average. Such areas have been, with trade union 
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approval, thoroughly examined by work study teams and in some cases 
bonus schemes introduced in the belief that this would improve efficiency 
and make the service less vulnerable to outside tender. In short the threat of 
privatisation has enabled boards to reach agreement locally with trade 
unions to improve efficiency, sometimes at the cost of jobs, in areas which 
management had long felt required change but in which they had not been 
able to implement it. In return there was an understanding that boards 
would not proceed with privatisation. 
Although aware of these developments, Ministers were not satisfied. 
Hence the circular instructing health boards (except Island boards) to put 
services for their headquarters and at least two hospitals out to tender by 
the end of 1984 and to prepare a three year programme for other services. 
Significantly this decision followed discussions between the Minister for 
Health and Social Work and health board chairmen. 
Trade unions in the NHS and the Labour Party were immediate and 
strong in their condemnation of the circular. NUPE discounted the alleged 
savings to be made from privatisation and saw the decision as a political, 
ideological act. A campaign of active resistance was called for. The STUC, 
through its health and social services committee, pledged to fight the 
decision and to co-ordinate the trade union response. In August the main 
TUC unions involved obtained legal advice that the circular was not 
mandatory on boards. This opinion, combined with considerable trade 
union activity helped Fife Health Board not to put the services out to 
tender, but instead to seek full co-operation with all parties to make savings 
and increase efficiency under Board managerial control. Fife were the first 
board to decide on the issue and their decision has since been challenged by 
the Minister, but the Fife decision remains a significant one from the 
unions' point of view in that the chairman of Fife Health Board is also the 
chairman of the Ancillary Staffs Whitley Council. Since the Fife decision in 
August some other boards have followed suit, whereas others are pressing 
ahead in putting the required services out to tender. Privatisation will be 
the dominant issue in health service industrial relations in the autumn of 
1984 and beyond. 
Griffiths 
The Griffiths Report on management in the NHS recommended, inter 
alia, the appointment of general managers at each level of management. 
The government accepted the recommendations and were proceeding to 
implement them in England. <19) In Scotland, the Secretary of State was in 
general agreement with the principles underlying the Report's 
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recommendations, but the SHHD promised a discussion document early in 
1984 before proceeding. The date for this was progressively put back and 
the document only appeared in early June calling for comments by the end 
of September. While again reorganisation proved a convenient excuse for 
the delay, it was clear that there was not a unified view among all the 
professional interests in St. Andrews House. 
The Secretary of State favoured the appointment of general managers 
at board level by the end of 1985, but at unit level there is to be an 
examination of unit structures, management information and budgeting 
systems prior to the introduction of general managers. This examination is 
to be completed by the end of 1986. General managers are to be appointed 
"on the basis of the criterion of the best person for the job, regardless of 
discipline" and "might be, but need not be, drawn from existing chief 
officers. ,(zo) 
The professional organisations whose members will be affected by the 
appointment of general managers are opposed to the plan.<ZJ) A major 
concern is where the new general managers will be drawn from and how 
such a general manager would relate to the professional and clinical 
responsibilities to the chief officers in each management area. It is in those 
boards without coterminous units that most problems in this area will arise 
and this is primarily why the Royal College of Nursing was particularly 
concerned about such structures. What chance have nurses got of becoming 
general managers if nursing management is divided between two or three 
units, whereas administrators and doctors command large budgets and staff 
resources? What authority will non-nursing general managers have over 
nursing managers? 
The trade union responses to the Social Services Committee expressed 
concern about the removal of consensus management. We have already 
seen that the change from districts to units has ended consensus 
management at that level and has led to problems on the question of the 
authority to dismiss. The appointment of general managers at health board 
level will pose similar questions there. The relationship of the personnel 
officer to top management may need reviewed. Should the APO continue 
to be responsible to the board secretary, or should his or her role as 
personnel officer to the whole board be emphasised by making the line of 
accountability direct to the general manager? A whole number of detailed 
questions about how the general manager will actually operate remain 
unanswered and while some points may be clarified during the consultation 
process, many will only be answered when general managers are actually in 
post. 
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Financial Cuts 
While financial cuts and closures have been the focus of much trade 
union activity and opposition in England, this has not been the case to the 
, same extent in Scotland. During 1983 there was a one percent cut in 
resources, but this was later reinstated and Scottish boards were not subject 
to forced staffing reductions as their English and Welsh counterparts were 
in September 1983.(22) Where financial savings are being made by boards 
they are not dramatic. It is largely a case of new things not happening; a 
ward not opening, a building not being upgraded, a facility not being 
developed. Therefore there are few concrete issues for the trade unions to 
focus on and attempt to rally their members and the public around, 
although protests are made as each new saving exercise is announced. 
At an all-Scotland level, the Scottish Trade Union Congress initiated 
the Scottish Health Service Campaign, calling for a real two percent growth 
in health service spending to cover the changing age profile of the 
population and developments in medical technology. This campaign has 
involved trade unions, local authorities, health councils and health 
consumer groups. A network of thirty local committees held over fifty 
public meetings throughout Scotland in the spring of 1984. A petition 
calling for the two percent real growth raised 250,000 signatures, and was 
presented to the Prime Minister on 27th June 1984. The steering committee 
of the Campaign recognises that its task is a long-term one and intend 
campaigning for the NHS through the lifetime of the present Conservative 
government and possibly beyond. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Issues about the management of the National Health Service and its 
industrial relations remain to be settled. The autumn of 1984 will see the 
questions of privatisation, cuts and Griffiths to the fore in public debate in 
Scotland and their resolution during 1985 will merit future study and 
analysis. 
Debate on the reorganisation process has largely been confined to the 
service itself although some of the decisions on management structure will 
clearly have implications for service delivery. After all the philosophy of 
Patients First and its Scottish counterpart was to move decision making 
closer to the point of service delivery. But the precise impact on patient 
services which the multi-variant unit structures will have remains to be 
seen, particularly in those boards which had concluded earlier that they 
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should retain districts. 
Our main concern has been the way in which this reorganisation has 
been brought about and the implications for industrial relations. The 
reorganisation in Scotland has also had implications with regard to the 
relationship between health boards and the SHHD. In this the role of 
health board chairmen has become decisive. The Secretary of State claims 
that the decision to remove districts in all boards was not taken by him, but 
by the chairmen. This raises fundamental questions about the powers of 
chairmen and their accountability to boards, which in turn raises questions 
about democracy and accountability of health boards themselves. For 
example, the STUC are concerned that their nominees on health boards 
have been reduced from 40 to 19 since the Conservatives took office in 
1979. Two boards, Forth Valley and Lothian now have no STUC nominees. 
Similarly the creation and use ofthe Chairmen's Committee on Gradings is 
further evidence of the growing power of chairmen. Its operation has left a 
number of aggrieved organisations and individuals in its wake; and the 
formal elements of appeals mechanisms may yet come under strain if a large 
number of gradings are appealed. There is legitimate concern that the 
Whitley Council machinery and its agreements on grading criteria, and the 
capacity for staff interests to agree matters such as structures and gradings 
locally, have been circumvented by the use of the Fyfe Committee. 
Otherwise at the health board level consultation and negotiation 
appear to have operated satisfactorily. In particular the slotting in and 
competition arrangements for posts in each board have gone smoothly 
although there have been examples of disappointment, frustration and 
bitterness when some individuals have not been appointed to particular 
vacancies. It is unlikely that there will be any compulsory redundancies 
resulting from reorganisation. While consultation and negotiation took 
place on an all-staff interest basis, it is unlikely that staff sides comprising 
both TUC and non-TUC organisations will continue in existence at the end 
of the reorganisation process. Reorganisation has been seen by most 
parties involved to be a special case, where the common purpose involved 
has drawn together the staff side and indeed management. This is not to say 
that there have been no differences but that these have in most cases been 
resolved. The experience of the Reorganisation Sub-Committee 
(Scotland), however, may well prompt the staff side to press for the 
establishment of a Scottish Whitley Advisory Committee to deal with 
Scottish issues in the future. However, the fundamentally political issues of 
privatisation and cuts will again find the TUC and non-TUC organisations 
opposed. Industrial relations in the National Health Service will therefore 
continue to be both interesting and controversial. 
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